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V.  Pricing the social contract in the British Columbian 
forest sector
This chapter is from Niquidet, K. Nelson, H. and Vertinsky, I. 2007. Pricing the social 
contract in the British Columbian forest sector. Accepted April 3, 2007. Canadian 
Journal of Forest Research.
Abstract
 In this paper we investigate the impact of various socio-economic conditions on the 
value of timber tenures in the province of British Columbia. Two timber tenure models 
were created, one for short-term Timber Sale Licenses and the other for longer term 
Forest Licenses. The short-term model revealed that timber sales which were awarded 
according to a combination of employment, revenue and manufacturing criteria yielded 
$8.63/m3 less revenue than timber sales awarded based on revenue alone. Similarly, the 
long-term model indicates that manufacturing and employment conditions significantly 
reduce the bid on Forest Licenses. In both instances, we suggest that such conditions 
distort the use of timber, labour and capital. Therefore we conclude that recent forest 
policy changes in the province that removed several of these conditions greatly improved 
economic efficiency. Nevertheless, distribution impacts are likely to be important, as 
resource rents have potentially been re-distributed away from rural communities to the 
provincial government. 
Introduction
 In Canada, forest ownership is predominately held by provincial governments. 
Each province has created its own unique tenure system which grants harvesting 
rights to private forest companies. In the largest timber producing region, British 
Columbia, there exists a complex array of tenure arrangements which vary according 
to their management responsibilities, term, and structure (i.e. area vs. volume based). 
Comprehensive descriptions of each tenure type can be found in numerous sources 
(van Kooten and Folmer 200; Luckert and Haley 990; Cashore et al. 200) and are 
therefore not repeated in this paper. Prior research has shown that the nature of these 
arrangements has a significant impact on investments in enhanced silviculture (Zhang 
and Pearse 996) and reforestation (Zhang and Pearse 997), as well as on the value of 
the tenure itself (Zhang 996). 
 Historically, many timber tenure arrangements in British Columbia, and in Canada 
for that matter, have been designed to meet a variety of socio-economic goals such as 




small operators. Collectively these tenure conditions have been dubbed as being part of 
a broader “social contract” between forest dependent communities and license holders. 
Virtually no work however has been done on quantifying the costs or benefits of these 
various tenure conditions. 
 To a large extent the lack of work in this area has probably been the result of the 
inadequate market transactions for timber tenures throughout the country. Tenures in 
Canada are often awarded via bilateral negotiations between industry and government or 
on the basis of non-price criteria, and transactions between companies regularly include 
other assets, making the assessment of the value of tenure on its own difficult. Zhang 
(996) notes this restriction, limiting his analysis in British Columbia to the Timber 
License tenure, the only tenure where he had a sufficient amount of market transactions. 
Timber Licenses however govern a very small portion of the annual timber harvest in the 
province and their award has ceased. Furthermore, unlike many of the other tenures in 
the province, they are relatively free of employment and manufacturing conditions. 
 Tenures coming from the province’s Small Business Forest Enterprise Program 
(SBFEP) on the other hand were full of such conditions. The SBFEP was designed 
to facilitate new entrants and to provide timber supplies to smaller loggers and 
manufacturers, particularly those with a focus on job and value added creation. As 
part of the province’s 2003 forestry revitalization regime, the SBFEP was restructured, 
increasing in size and receiving a new, revenue focused, directive. To reflect this, many 
of the socio-economic tenure conditions were dropped and the program was re-named 
British Columbia Timber Sales (BCTS). The primary goal of this paper is to assess the 
benefit of dropping these conditions, or seen another way, to assess the cost in terms of 
forgone rents of the various SBFEP aspirations. The results of this study can help guide 
policy makers both in Canada and in other forest jurisdictions who have similar socio-
economic goals. 
 The structure of the paper is the following. In the first section some background is 
provided which outlines the organization and goals of the SBFEP, this is followed by a 
description of BCTS, its organization, and its mandate. The ensuing section presents the 
methodology for two timber market models, one for short-term timber tenures and the 
other for longer term tenures. The goal of each model is to establish the shadow price 
of various employment, processing and size constraints. The results of these empirical 
models are then presented in the next section. A discussion and our conclusions follow 
in the subsequent sections.
Background
Small Business Forest Enterprise Program
 The creation of the SBFEP in 980 resulted from the recommendations of the royal 
commission conducted by Pearse (976). In his report he voiced concern about the 
  This was largely due to appurtenancy clauses which tied timber tenures to manufacturing facilities. 
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lack of opportunity new entrants and smaller producers had in the forest sector, which 
stemmed from the full allocation of Annual Allowable Cuts (AACs) to major integrated 
forest products companies. The program began small, as it was initially allocated a small 
portion of the provincial AAC, but this was expanded in the late 980s and 990s 
in an effort to reverse the declining employment and value added in the provincial 
forest economy (M’Gonigle and Parfitt 99). These expansions brought the size of the 
program up to approximately 3% of the provincial AAC.
 There were three types of registrants in the SBFEP:
1.	 	Category	1 - market loggers, who harvest timber and do not do any processing. 
2.	 	Category	2 – sawmill owners who had no replaceable tenure, value added primary 
processors and remanufactures.
3.	 	Category	3 – registrants who do not have a mill or processing facility but commit to 
building one. Corporations holding licenses with an AAC greater than 0,000 m3 
are not eligible, however. Once category 3 registrants are awarded a timber sale and a 
timber processing facility is built, they would then enter category 2. 
Each of these registrants was eligible, in varying degrees, for the award of public timber. 
 Section 20 of the program awarded short-term timber sale licenses (TSLs) to eligible 
registrants solely on the basis of revenue. This was accomplished by a first price, sealed 
bid auction. Unlike many of the other provincial tenures, a TSL carried with it no 
pre-harvesting management responsibilities, as the SBFEP designed the logging unit 
and submitted the various management plans to the appropriate government ministry 
for approval. Furthermore, the license holder was not responsible for reforesting the 
site after harvesting, as this duty was also carried out by the SBFEP. Effectively the 
license was strictly for the right to harvest and sell the designated timber within the 
unit boundaries within an established time frame, which was usually around a year but 
occasionally up to  years. The majority of section 20 sales were open to market loggers 
registered in category . In some cases, however, the sale only offered a small volume or 
required labour intensive extractive methods (e.g. horse logging), which had the effect 
of deterring larger companies. In addition, on frequent occasions bidding was restricted 
to those with registration in category 2. 
 The other major type of SBFEP TSL was Section 2 sales. These sales targeted firms 
who planned to maintain, expand or build value added processing facilities. As a result, 
eligible bidders were restricted to category 2 registrants, but occasionally were open to 
category 3 members. Unlike section 20 sales however, the award of section 2 TSLs was 
based on a combination of revenue and non-revenue criteria. Accordingly, section 2 
sales were often termed bid proposals. This was reflected in the stated objectives of the 
section 2 program (British Columbia Ministry of Forests and Range 2006):
.  To provide opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurs in independent smaller 
firms;
2.  To encourage and promote greater employment and community stability through 
economically sound and viable remanufacturing and the production of specialty 
wood products by independent remanufactures in British Columbia; and,
3.  To award sales competitively.
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The usual criteria and the respective weighting each criterion received in the award of a 
bid proposal are shown in table  (Ibid).





New capital investment 0
Labour value-added 5
Change in value-added 5
Revenue 20
 The SBFEP also awarded longer term non-replaceable Forest Licenses (NRFLs) to 
those registered in categories 2 and 3. Unlike the TSLs, NRFLs did not specifically 
identify the timber which was to be harvested. Instead they grant an annual cut level 
within a broad geographical area and the licensee is responsible for pre-harvest planning, 
including the design and inventory of the logging unit and reforesting the site after 
harvesting. Prior to the Forestry Revitalization Plan (FRP) these NRFLs were typically 
awarded through the SBFEP based on what the application brought in terms of revenue 
(as offered by lump sum bid), employment and processing. Furthermore, unlike TSLs 
where stumpage fees are determined by the auction bid, timber harvested from NRFLs 
is subject to a volumetric administered stumpage fee, which is derived from a pricing 
formula. 
British Columbia Timber Sales
  BCTS came into existence on  April 2003 following the announcement of the FRP.
In contrast to the SBFEP its stated objective is:
  “BCTS aims to generate the best possible financial return to the Crown from 
publicly-owned timber, provide timber opportunities, and set a credible reference 
point for the price and cost of timber harvested from Crown land.” (BCTS 2006)
 To meet the first objective, BCTS no longer offers section 2 sales, reallocating this 
volume to section 20 where it is awarded strictly to the highest bidder. Furthermore, 
major integrated tenure holders who hold greater than 0,000 m3 of AAC will no 
longer be excluded from registering in category . For an undisclosed temporary period 
however, some sales will continue to be restricted to category 2 registrants. In addition, 
BCTS will presumably increase the size of its sales and will eliminate the practise of 
setting aside special horse logging sales, unless forest management objectives dictate. 
 To meet the other two objectives, increased volumes will flow through the program; 
moving from approximately 3% of the provincial AAC to 20%. This volume should 
also lessen any entry barriers as the additional volume will be sourced from the timber 
“take back” which re-allocates 20% of the volume from long-term renewable tenures 
held by large integrated forest companies to BCTS, community forest licenses, small 
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woodlots, and first nations groups. With the 20% auctioned under BCTS now to be 
used to derive a new pricing formula on long-term area and volume based tenures. 
 BCTS also will no longer auction NRFLs, as all of this volume flowed into section 20. 
In spite of this, the government has had some additional volume available to it as a result 
of uplifts to AACs in areas impacted by the mountain pine beetle infestation. With this 
volume, the Ministry of Forests and Range, rather than BCTS, created and auctioned 
several new NRFLs. Although the award of these new NRFLs was strictly based on the 
highest bid measured by revenue, the design of many of these licenses suggests that 
there was a concerted effort to foster new entrants in processing, particularly in non-
lumber forest products. For on several occasions bidding was restricted to those who 
would commit to building new non-lumber processing capacity. It was hoped that this 
capacity will divert volume away from U.S. softwood lumber markets, thus attempting 
to remove the possibility of affecting their domestic producers, who - as history has 
shown - have been successful at lobbying for trade restrictions.
Methodology: Timber Market Models
Short–term timber sales
 A dataset of TSLs issued in the Interior of the Province under both the section 20 
and section 2 programs from January 999 to June 200 was retrieved from the BC 
Ministry of Forests and Range. Table 2 summarizes the number of sales in each year by 
category. 
Table 2. Timber sales by category and year
 Section 20 Section 2  
Year Category 1 Category 2 Bid Proposal Total 
999 32 62 7 9
2000 278 58 90 26
200 233 2 3 06
2002 283  50 37
2003 252 35 7 30
200 77 3 0 80
Total 35 2 05 208
 From this data, we sought to develop a hedonic timber model which related a bid (b) 
on any given TSL (i)	to its characteristics (x). The bid for the TSL could be an indication 
of the available natural resource rent associated with the timber, therefore a	 priori	
variables that reflected timber and site quality (Ricardian	rent) as well as location (von	
Thunen	rent) were included in x. We also included variables that reflected the derived 
demand for timber, the logging method, and the size of the timber sale. A detailed 




•  Species – Each tree species has its own intrinsic properties which may affect 
either the selling price of downstream products derived from timber or the costs 
of extracting and processing timber. For this reason, the fraction of the timber 
sale composed of balsam (BA), western red cedar (CE), Douglas fir (DF), western 
hemlock (HE) and white pine (WH) were included in the model. The remaining 
major commercial species in the Interior (lodgepole pine and spruce), which are 
often marketed together, were included in the constant. 
•  Merchantable volume per tree (VPT) – Many higher valued sawnwood products 
(e.g. appearance grades etc.) are derived from larger trees. Furthermore, larger 
stems can be expected to improve productivity in timber extraction and processing. 
We anticipate that diminishing returns to tree size will occur however (indeed 
at some point larger trees may become a problem for some mechanized logging 
equipment). As a consequence, we expect bids to increase in VPT at a decreasing 
rate.
•  Merchantable volume per hectare (VPH) – Higher density stands tend to be 
higher quality (less branching). They also facilitate extraction as equipment does 
not have to move as much to remove a unit of roundwood. Both factors lead us 
to believe that timber sales with higher VPH will result in higher bids. 
•  Fire damage (BURN) – Percent of timber sale volume with fire damage. Residual 
wood chips often cannot be used once timber is charred by fire and extracting 
and processing fire damaged timber is particularly hard on equipment, increasing 
costs. Therefore we expect BURN volume will reduce stumpage. 
•  Beetle damage (SALVAGE) – Sales that had greater than 30% of their volume 
infested by bark beetles were classified by the British Columbia Ministry of 
Forests and Range as Salvage sales. Such sales were denoted with an indicator 
variable (0/) as the exact infestation percentage was not given in our data. The 
reduced quality (blue stain, checking etc.) associated with this infested timber is 
expected to negatively impact bids. 
•  Wind damage (BLOWDOWN) – Percent of timber sale volume which is 
classified as blowdown. Blowdown timber typically contains significant defect 
and is costly to extract, therefore its presence is expected to devalue the timber 
sale.
•  Average Slope (%) of the terrain (SLOPE) – In general steeper slopes are expected 
to adversely impact the productivity of timber extraction and hence lower bids. 
However, the marginal impact of slope may vary throughout its range. Therefore, 
several functional forms will be tested.
Location
•  Round trip haul time (CYCLE) – calculated using distances and road speeds 
from the timber sale to the nearest manufacturing centre. It also includes an 
hour for loading and unloading. Given that trucking contracts in the Interior are 
usually based on a fixed ‘tonne hour’ payment schedule, log transportation costs 
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are expected to increase linearly with cycle time.
•  Region – The Interior of the province has been divided into 5 ‘selling price’ 
zones by the Ministry of Forest and Range for timber appraisal purposes. Each 
zone corresponding to a different geographical part of the Interior. These zones 
and the broad geographic areas they represent are: zone 5 (North-central), zone 
6 (Northwest), zone 7 (Southeast), zone 8 (Southwest), zone 9 (Northeast). Four 
of the zones were assigned dummy variables (zones 5, 6, 8, 9) with zone 7 being 
treated as a reference zone, included in the constant. Such zonal dummy variables 
being in place in an attempt to capture localized market conditions (competition 
levels, timber supply, distance to final product markets etc.). 
Derived	Demand
•  Lumber Price Index (LPI) – This variable was constructed by taking the lumber 
recovery factor (LRF) of the timber sale (in thousand board feet per m3), which 
proxies the marginal product of timber, and multiplying it by the prevailing 
lumber price at the time of the timber sale (CAN $ / thousand board feet). 
Through the derived demand process, increased lumber prices are expected to 
translate through into higher timber prices. 
•  Countervailing Duty (DUTY) – This is an indicator variable (0/) which denotes 
those timber sales that were auctioned after countervailing duties were imposed 
on Canadian lumber destined to the United States (0 August 200).
Logging	Costs
•  Logging Method – most timber in the Interior is clearcut and extracted by 
conventional ground-based equipment (feller buncher/grapple skidder). Due to 
terrain, soil conditions or other management objectives, alternative extraction 
methods and partial cutting may be prescribed though. To control for these 
circumstances, the fraction of the timber sale volume requiring extraction via 
helicopters (HELI), horses (HORSE), or cables (CABLE) were included as 
explanatory variables. The fraction of the sale retained after harvesting (PART_
CUT) was also included to capture partial cutting applications. 
•  Net merchantable volume of timber sale (NCV) - This variable was included to 
consider any economies of scale in logging operations. As such we expect the 
relationship between bids and the scale of the timber sale to be positive until 
decreasing returns to scale set in.
 
After controlling for the above rent producing factors, we thought dummy variables 
which denote the type of sale could be included, allowing us to estimate the impact 
of the constraints associated with each type of sale (category  sales were treated 
as reference sales, included in the constant). Descriptive statistics for both the 
dependent and explanatory variables listed above are included in table 3.
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Table 3. Variables in the short-term tenure model
Variable Abbreviation Mean Min Max
Bid for timber sale (997 CAN $/m3) b 37.8 0.23 2.2
Fraction of timber sale composed of balsam BA 0.08 0 
Fraction of timber sale composed of western  
red cedar
CE 0.03 0 0.88
Fraction of timber sale composed of Douglas fir DF 0.09 0 
Fraction of timber sale composed of western 
hemlock
HE 0.06 0 0.98
Fraction of timber sale composed of white pine WH 0.00 0 0.29
Lumber price index (997 CAN $/m3) LPI 97. 27.60 60.69
Percent of timber sale with fire damage BURN .72 0 00
Net merchantable volume of timber sale 
(000 m3)
NCV 3.09 0.0 29.69
Fraction of timber sale extracted by helicopter HELI 0.02 0 
Fraction of timber sale extracted by horses HORSE 0.05 0 
Fraction of timber sale extracted by cables CABLE 0.07 0 
Merchantable volume per tree (m3) VPT 0.53 0.08 3.5
Volume per ha (m3) VPH 28.3 0.30 78.02
Slope of the terrain (%) SLOPE 20.50 0 86
Percent of volume with wind damage (%) BLOWDOWN 3.3 0 00
The fraction of timber sale retained after 
harvesting
PART_CUT 0.07 0 0.99
Round trip haul time (hours) CYCLE .0 .20 2.00
Sales with more than 30% beetle damage SALVAGE 0.22 0 
Sales auctioned after countervailing duties DUTY 0.50 0 
Sales in zone 9 NORTHEAST 0.0 0 
Sales in zone 5 NORTHCENTRAL 0.32 0 
Sales in zone 6 NORTHWEST 0.07 0 
Sales in zone 8 SOUTHWEST 0.3 0 
Section 2 sales BP 0.20 0 
Section 20 category 2 sales CAT2 0.2 0 
Section 20 category  sales auctioned by BCTS BCTS 0.6 0 
Reserve price (997 CAN $/m3) RP 28.68 0.22 62.52
 A potential problem with our hedonic model though is the presence of 5 timber 
sales where no sale occurred. In these instances, no bidders were willing to pay the 
announced reserve price at the auction and so the bid is not observed. The exclusion of 
these sales could potentially result in a selectivity bias resulting in incorrect parameter 
estimates for the hedonic model (Huang and Buongiorno 986, Niquidet and van 
Kooten 2006). Having the characteristics of these no bid sales, however, allows us to 
generate a Heckman model to test and correct for selectivity bias. 
 The Heckman model contains two equations. In addition to the bid equation, known 
as the outcome equation, there is a selection equation which models the occurrence of a 
sale. An outcome only occurs (i.e. a bid is observed) when at least one bidder’s valuation 
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(V
i
) is greater than the reservation price (RP
i






, then the 
model can be summarized as:




γ - ui	 selection (sale) equation




b - ei  outcome (bid) equation
Where z
i 
is a vector containing timber sale variables that influence V
i





 is a vector of variables explaining the bid and γ and b are parameters to be 
estimated. With u ~ N(0,), e	~ N(0,σ) and corr(u,e) = ρ.
Where d
i
 =  if d
i






 = . 
   
Therefore, the expected bid, conditional on it being observed is (Greene 2000 p. 929):








b + ρσλ (z
i´	
γ)
Where , with  and being the standard normal and cumulative 
normal probability distribution functions respectively. This term is known as the inverse 
mills ratio, its inclusion mimics the non-zero expected mean error term brought on 
by the selection process. If it proves to be significant in the regression, the classical 
regression model, where observed bids are regressed on x
i
 only, suffer from a missing 
variables problem, resulting in inconsistent parameter estimates. 
 The Heckman model is usually estimated in two different ways. Heckman (979) 
proposed a two step procedure by way of limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML). In the first step, a probit model is formed and the parameters of the selection 
equation (γ) are estimated by maximum likelihood. These estimates are used to construct 
the inverse mills ratio which is used as a regressor in the estimation of equation 3 by 
OLS. The two step procedure, however, has shown to be unreliable in small samples and 




) (Puhani 200). This should not be 
an issue in our timber model as 208 observations ought to be sufficiently large, and 
at the very least z
i




 will not. Nevertheless, a full information 
maximum likelihood estimator (FIML), while often computationally difficult, offers a 
more efficient alternative to the two step estimator, and so it was chosen as our default 
estimation method, provided we could get convergence. 
 The consistency of the LIML estimator and the asymptotic efficiency of the FIML 




. Pagan and 
Vella (989) provide a diagnostic test for this assumption which involves including 
, j = , 2, 3 as additional variables in the outcome equation. If the 





 In order to investigate the cost of the non-lumber capacity restrictions as well as 
previous tenure restrictions that focussed on employment criteria, we compiled and 
analyzed the auction results (lump-sum bids) for NRFLs in the Interior of British 
Columbia. Data on the bids for these NRFLs for the period January 2002 to July 2006 was 
retrieved from an independent timber price reporting agency operating in the province.2 
Seeing that the timber associated with NRFLs is only broadly specified, our dataset, in 
large part, contains variables that reflect the characteristics of the license, rather than the 
timber itself. We do not anticipate this to be a problem as the administered stumpage fee 
charged at the time of harvesting should capture the differential rents between stands.3 
 As a starting point we hypothesized that the lump sum bid (BID) on each license 
should represent the discounted value of the expected revenue stream accruing to the 
licensee over the term of the NRFL. Assuming that the annual net revenue (R) is simply 
the annual allowable cut (AAC) multiplied by the expected payment from harvesting 
per cubic metre (p), the expected bid for license j	is given by:
[] 
Where t	is the term of the NRFL in years and r	is the discount rate. If we divide each 
side of equation  by the AAC, we can rewrite the condition as:
[5] 
In our dataset BID,	AAC	and t	are all given for each NRFL. If we assume a discount rate, 
the term in brackets (the discount factor) can also be identified, leaving p as the only 





 is the discount factor in equation 5, and v
j
 is a disturbance term with mean 
zero.
 The above model is not sufficient though as we suspect the expected payment will 
vary according the characteristics of the NRFL. Economies of scale may be important 
in the management of these tenures and the various tenure conditions could prove to be 




3  The administered stumpage fee is based on an equation that contains adjustments for the timber characteristics listed 
in the short-term tenure model. An additional allowance is also made for the fact that long term tenure holders are 
responsible for some management planning and reforestation.
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Where c is a constant term, CAP	is a dummy variable taking the value of  for those 
tenures where bidders must create or expand non-lumber capacity and 0 otherwise, 
PROB is another dummy variable that takes the value of  when the tenure is restricted 
to problem forest types and 0 otherwise, SAL	 indicates licenses where harvest units 
are limited to salvage sites less than 0 ha in size, EMPLOY	indicates licenses that were 
awarded on the basis of price and by the degree of local employment the bidder offered, 
all of which were awarded prior to the FRP, and AAC, which was defined earlier and 
could take various functional forms, captures the prospective effect of scale. Descriptive 
statistics for the variables can be found in table .
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for NRFL model
Variable Abbreviation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lump sum bid (997 CAN $) BID 92 288 3 755 567 0 26 600 000
Annual allowable cut (m3) AAC  980 2 86 7 500 700 000
Term of license(years) t 5.7 3.33 2 5
Licenses with manufacturing 
requirements
CAP 0.2 0.33 0 
Licenses restricted to problem 
forest types
PROB 0. 0.30 0 
Licenses awarded by employment 
criteria
EMPLOY 0.08 0.27 0 
Licenses restricted to salvage sites SAL 0.26 0. 0 
Substituting equation 7 into equation 6, we obtain the final model:
[8] 
The regression parameters directly yield the shadow price of the various tenure conditions. 
Once they are estimated, one could also extend the model to value replaceable or 
“evergreen” Forest Licenses, which are expected to be renewed in perpetuity. For when 
t	→	∞, equation 5 becomes:
[9] 
The valuation of replaceable Forest Licenses is especially important as they cover the 
greatest portion (37%) of the annual harvest in British Columbia (Berry 2006). On 
several occasions the government has confiscated these licenses to establish parks or 
in recent times to expand their auction and small tenures program. The provincial 
Forest	Act however requires that the license holder be compensated for these takings. 
As noted by Schwindt and Globerman (996) the lack of market evidence has made 
  Problem forest types are defined as timber stands that have a volume per tree less than 0.2m3
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these compensation proceedings difficult. Therefore, such modelling could be a useful 
input in future compensation proceedings, particularly as the sample size of transactions 
increases. One must use the model with caution however, as replaceable Forest Licenses 
may carry with them different management responsibilities and therefore might be 
priced differently. 
Table 5. Short-term tenure model results
 Bid Equation Sale Equation
Variable Coefficent P-value Coefficent P-value
CONSTANT .83 0.000 5.336 0.000
BA -2.37 0.000 -.803 0.000
CE 9.952 0.000 .535 0.000
DF .59 0.60 0.256 0.082
HE -2.76 0.000 -.856 0.000
WH 9.00 0.370 0.960 0.78
LPI 0.68 0.000 0.023 0.000
BURN -0.207 0.000 -0.06 0.000
NCV 0.5 0.000 0.09 0.000
NCV2 -0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
HELI -38.973 0.000 -5.088 0.000
HORSE -3.26 0.000 -.776 0.000
CABLE -0.60 0.000 -.260 0.000
LN(VPT) 8.526 0.000 . 0.000
VPH 0.020 0.000 0.003 0.000
SLOPE2 -0.002 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
BLOWDOWN -0.2 0.000 -0.08 0.000
PART_CUT -.79 0.000 -0.393 0.0
CYCLE -.920 0.000 -0.26 0.000
SALVAGE -3.589 0.000 -0.88 0.000
NORTHEAST -.895 0.000 -.500 0.000
NORTHCENTRAL -7. 0.000 -.00 0.000
NORTHWEST -8.52 0.000 -.036 0.000
SOUTHWEST -3.695 0.000 -0.90 0.000
DUTY -2.8 0.000 -0.269 0.000





λ 7.99 0.000   
No. Observations 208 (5 censored)
Log Liklihood -700.65
χ 2(28) 502.88 0.000   
9
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Results 
Short-term timber sale model
 We ran several preliminary models allowing each of the explanatory variables to take 
on different functional forms. A linear relationship with bid in most cases fit the data 
best, the exceptions being NCV, VPT, and SLOPE, which took on quadratic, natural 
log and exponential (squared) functional forms respectively. We also searched for other 
variations in bids throughout time, finding that sales in the year 999 commanded a 
premium.5 
 Moreover, the dummy variables denoting the type of sale were excluded from the 
sale (selection) equation as the no bid sales proved to consist only of category  timber 
sales. One could question the inclusion of these dummy variables on theoretical grounds 
as well, as there were no restrictions on re-selling timber and hence one could argue 
that the type of sale would have no impact on the value of the timber in question. The 
impact of the different sale types rather was through the bidding process; the ability to 
pay for the timber by other means (employment, existing capital etc.) in the case of bid 
proposals and reduced competition in the other cases.
 Results for both the sale and bid equations stemming from this specification are 
listed below in table 5, estimated with FIML using STATA™ 9..
 The model as a whole was highly significant, as were most variables in both equations. 
To confirm the consistency of our estimates, the Pagan and Vella test for normality 
described earlier was conducted. The coefficients and p-values associated with each of 
the test variables were: (z
i´	
γˆ )  λ (z
i´	
γˆ )  = 2.8 (p-value 0.9); (z
i´	
γˆ ) 2 λ (z
i´	
γˆ )= 5.05 (p-value 
0.5); (z
i´	
γˆ ) 3 λ (z
i´	
γˆ )= .2 (p-value 0.233). A Wald test, which tests if the coefficients 
are jointly zero, could not be rejected suggesting our estimates are asymptotically efficient 
(χ2 3.39, p-value 0.336). 
 The signs on the coefficients in the sale equation all make good sense as variables that 
are expected to increase the value of the timber (and bid) also increased the probability of a 
sale, holding the reserve price constant. Likewise the negative coefficient on the reserve price 
indicates that increasing the reserve price decreased the probability of a sale, keeping timber 
value constant. The significance of the inverse mills ratio in the bid equation indicates 
that even with such a low degree of censoring, including the no bid data is necessary for 
unbiased estimates, a result consistent with Niquidet and van Kooten (2006). 
 The coefficient on the variable HORSE suggests that extraction with horses is 
$3.26/m3 more costly than conventional mechanized methods. This added cost may 
be justified in some cases where the achievement of a light harvesting footprint is called 
for. However using horse logging simply as a means of generating more employment, 
as was sometimes done under the SBFEP, is a rather unproductive use of resources. The 
same can be said for the creation of small timber sales aimed at helping small operators. 
5  This might be the result of the price wedge between lumber prices in the U.S. and Canada, owed to the softwood 
lumber agreement, which was especially high in 999 (Stennes and Wilson 2005). The higher bids reflecting 




The coefficients on the NCV variables suggest that economies of scale are important in 
harvesting operations and reducing sale volume simply to provide for smaller operators 
has significant costs. The quadratic relationship between the bid and sale size does suggest 
however that there is a point where these increasing returns to scale become exhausted. 
We calculated this point by differentiating the bid equation with respect to NCV, finding 
that the optimum sale size is 0 63 m3. Comparing bids evaluated at this optimum to 
the sample mean (3 090 m3), generates a $5.58/m3 difference in bids.6
 As for the influence of the various types of sales, results are as one might expect. The 
most restrictive timber sales, Section 2 bid proposals, received the least revenue, some 
$8.63/m3 less than section 20 timber sales auctioned to market loggers. Given that the bid 
proposal program represented about 7% of the provincial AAC, this result suggests that 
the provincial treasury can be expected to gain roughly CAN $ 2.3 million per year, as a 
result of dropping this program.7 As indicated by the coefficient on CAT2, some further 
revenue gains may be available by dropping the set aside program which restricts bidders 
on certain sales to be registered in category 2. This variable is only significant at the  % 
level however, perhaps explaining why BCTS has continued the program in spite of its 
new revenue focussed mandate. The positive coefficient on the BCTS indicator variable 
suggests that the agency has increased revenue on section 20 sales as well. This might stem 
from a host of timber sale related practices that have changed since BCTS has taken the 
helm. Perhaps the key change being the elimination of restrictions that prevented major 
integrated forest product manufacturers from bidding directly on section 20 sales along side 
independent logging firms. While statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient 
implies that using market loggers as surrogate bidders has little real impact on efficiency. 
Long-term tenure model
 Seeing that our long-term tenure model is dependent on the choice of an assumed 
discount rate, we ran the model based on several different rate assumptions (ranging 
6  This analysis is based on the full latent distribution (b*) not the truncated distribution (b). Also the coefficients used 
were .5 73 for NCV and -.000 79 for NCV2 rather than the rounded numbers reported in Table 5.
7  Assuming a Provincial AAC of 70 million m3 and that the same results in the Interior apply to the Coast. 
Table 6. NRFL bid model results: dependent variable BID/AAC 
Variable Coefficient P-Value
d 2.002 0.00
CAP d -2.222 0.02
EMPLOY d -2.35 0.05
PROB d -0.777 0.35
SAL d .83 0.076
AAC2 d 5.7 x 0- 0.028
No. Observations 50
R2 0.59
F statistic 0.33  0.000
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from % to 20%). We also experimented with various functional forms for the variable 
AAC, finding that AAC2 fit the data best. The 8% model was chosen based on the fact 
that it produced the smallest sum of squared error and the highest F-statistic. The results 
from this formulation are reported in table 6. 
 The variables CAP	d and EMPLOY	d	proved to be negative and significant revealing that 
the objective of generating a non-lumber industry and the promotion of employment in 
the forest sector each come with their own respective price tags. The fact that the coefficient 
for problem forest types is not significant, suggests that in spite of the timber being of 
substantially lower quality, bidders anticipate that the stumpage system will adjust to reflect 
these quality differences. Somewhat puzzlingly, however, a higher payout is expected for 
salvage sites. We can only suggest that this might be due to a timber pricing expectation, as 
traditionally stumpage breaks are given for damaged timber and small operating units. The 
positive and significant coefficient associated with AAC2, shows that economies of scale are 
important in the management of long-term tenures as well. This result might explain some 
of the recent consolidation in the Interior and why the provincial government has tended 
to favour the relatively larger community forests over woodlots, in the tenure re-allocation 
process. 
 Next, we calculated the expected value of a replaceable Forest License for the Interior. 
This was done by taking the estimated expected payment for a regular NRFL, 00,000 m3 
in size ($2.05/m3) and plugging it into equation 9. Assuming that one expects the license to 
always be renewed in perpetuity and that it requires the same management responsibilities 
as those in our dataset, the value of such a Forest License is $25.63 per m3 of AAC. 
 One must be cautious however, as the overall explanatory power of our model can be 
considered moderate (R2 0.59). This could be due to missing relevant explanatory variables 
that were not available to us or because of the structure imposed on the model (constant 
expected payment and harvest levels per annum). Such a structure may not accurately 
depict reality as tenure holders do have some flexibility over when they harvest (transferring 
AAC from year to year within a 5 year period) and the nature of the stumpage system could 
mean that they expect different payments at different times in the business cycle (Grafton et 
al. 996). This motivated us to seek a better fitting model allowing the relationship between 
the bid and t	to take a more generalized form. We found some improvement as a log-log 
formulation provided some additional explanatory power, although this transformation 
meant dropping two observations where BID was zero (both of which were awarded 
according to employment). This model is reported in table 7.
 We can essentially draw the same conclusions as the sign and significance of the 
explanatory variables are the same as the previous model, the exception being SAL which is 
now not significant. 
Discussion
Costs or Transfers?
 The results of the previous section show that the provincial government foregoes 
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substantial amounts of revenue by imposing several of these tenure conditions. Is this an 
efficiency issue or a distributional issue? Should all of the revenue losses be viewed as a cost 
in the sense that they have reduced the overall rent available, or are they simply a transfer of 
resource rents from the landowner (the government) to owners of capital and labour? The 
answer to these questions depends to some extent on the tenure condition in question.
 In cases where a timber sale could have been re-structured to reduce extraction 
costs (use machinery, larger timber sale) then clearly there is a loss of available rents 
and the lost revenue can be seen as the deadweight loss associated with re-distributing 









) and the 
available rent by area abcd. 
 On occasions where employment and processing counted as part of the bid for 
timber, the answer is not as clear. It ultimately depends on whether labour and capital’s 
claim to resource rents through the bidding process contributed to their transfer 
earnings - the returns required to prevent them from leaving to other uses - which 
are a reflection of their opportunity cost. If the shift of resource rents was indeed all 
surplus to the factor’s transfer earnings, then these conditions should not be viewed as 
a cost, but simply a transfer, having no impact on efficiency. However, if the resource 
rents distort the employment of labour and capital, then the tenure conditions can be 
viewed as being costly. The cost being the opportunity cost of the factor in production 
elsewhere in the economy. 
 As alluded to earlier, since there were no restrictions on re-selling the timber to its 
highest valued use, or on how the timber was to be extracted, the value of the timber 
on the stump should not be impacted. Indeed, the common practise for those who 
were awarded bid proposals was to sell the timber to a major lumber producer in 
exchange for cash and/or supplies that were inputs to their re-manufacturing facility. 
The bidding process simply allowed firms to use their employees and capital as a claim 
towards the resource rents. If this labour and capital use would have occurred in spite 
of this claim, then this would just be a transfer of resource rents from the government 
to the firm. However, economic theory would suggest that there was a clear incentive 








AAC2 7.38 x 0- 0.023
No. Observations 8
R2 0.79
F statistic 25.9 0.000
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to overuse labour and capital, as their marginal value product would have increased 
because they now had a value in the purchase of timber. The only case where this 
increased demand for labour/capital would not draw in more of their use, would be 
if the supply of these factors was perfectly inelastic, reflecting the fact that the factor 
had no alternate use. This seems completely unlikely, particularly for capital, but 
also for labour as there has been a general shortage in labour supplies throughout the 
province. Although, in the short-run, it might apply to some regional labour markets 
where there is high unemployment and labour is very immobile. 
 The ultimate test then, is to see how the use of a factor changes once its claim 
to resource rents is taken away. If there is no change in use, then the resource rents 
were just a surplus value transferred from government. However, if there is now less 
employment of labour and capital, then resource rents were contributing to keeping 
the factor in its use. Recent downward trends in forest sector employment and the 
capacity utilization of smaller mills identified by Nelson et al. (2006) seems to suggest 
the latter. So does a study by Parfitt (2005) which shows the value added share of 
total wood exports falling by % between 2003 and 200, corresponding to the end 
Figure 1. Resource rents lost from increased extraction costs
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of the bid proposal program. This suggests that there were gains to dropping the bid 
proposal program, as resources were freed up for production elsewhere. In addition, 
government resources are also likely to be saved, as bureaucrats who once spent hours 
grading bid proposals for their contribution to each of the criteria can now simply 
award timber to the bidder who is willing to pay the most, a process that is also far 
more transparent. 
Distributional Issues
 Regardless of the degree to which the increased revenue collected by government 
as a result of dropping these tenure conditions will be a transfer or a gain, there 
are distributional impacts to consider. In particular, resource rents which were once 
leaked in the form of wages, capital investment, or simply as excess profits to the 
owners of small local firms, are no longer available. In many cases this will mean a 
net loss of income for rural regions which are heavily dependent on the forest sector. 
Alternate opportunities for labour and capital will often be found elsewhere, resulting 
in regional decline in some cases. Such a result is often counter to a government’s 
objective and politically unacceptable. 
 To deal with these distributional issues, lump sum transfers could be made to 
regions that are negatively impacted, helping them make the transition. This may 
take the form of re-training or new investment in infrastructure; these investments 
however should also earn their opportunity cost. The government may also think 
about assigning property rights over forest resources to impacted communities. This 
is already being done to some extent, by the increase in the issuance of community 
forests tenures. These tenures however should be free of unnecessary conditions and 
should be large enough so that economies of scale can be gained, thus not reducing 
the resource rent available. Moreover, the stumpage fees on these tenures could be 
reduced, granting the community a greater share of the available rent. The degree 
to which will depend on the political process. Whatever the circumstance, the rent 
sharing agreement should be done in a manner that does not distort resource use. 
Conclusion
  The goal of this paper was to highlight and quantify the costs of several socio-
economic tenure conditions in British Columbia. While we feel more work in 
general is needed on the valuation of timber tenures in the province and in Canada 
(particularly long-term tenures), our results indicate most of these conditions serve 
to severely reduce the resource rents collected by the provincial government. In most 
cases, we suggest that these are more than just wealth transfers as they distort the use 
of capital and labour. These are real costs that should not be taken lightly in the design 
of forest tenures. Therefore, we conclude that dropping several of these conditions has 
been a tremendous benefit to the province and a gain in economic efficiency. While 
we realize that distributional impacts are likely to be important considerations, effort 
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should be made to design policy such that these distributional goals are met in a 
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